Research 

Said Foundation Best Paper Award 

Abstract: I study the real effects of high-technology IPOs on local labor and housing markets. Using a spatial difference-in-differences design that exploits withdrawn IPO filings as counterfactuals, I find that high-skilled incumbent wages increase by 1.51% following IPOs, while a 0.51% nominal gain for low-skilled workers is outpaced by housing cost increase, reducing their real wages. A falsification using non-high-tech IPOs reveals that all listings generate wealth-driven housing appreciation, but only high-technology IPOs widen the wage premium, isolating skill-biased knowledge spillovers as the mechanism. A spatial equilibrium model estimates these spillovers raise high-skilled productivity by 14.3% at the IPO epicenter. High-skilled residents capture net welfare gains, whereas low-skilled incumbents suffer displacement-inducing losses.

Presentations: American Finance Association (AFA), Dauphine PhD Workshop, European Finance Association Doctoral Tutorial (EFA-DT), Urban Economics Association North American (UEA North American), Financial Intermediation Research Society Ph.D Session (FIRS), Urban Economics Association European (UEA European), London Business School Trans-Atlantic Doctoral Conference (LBS TADC), Royal Economic Society Annual Conference (RES Annual Conference), 4th Workshop on Markets and Intermediaries at Deutsche Bundesbank,  Applied Young Economist Webinar, University of Oxford

Abstract:  We identify a hidden cost of agglomeration: the distortion of innovation direction due to talent competition. While clustering fosters knowledge spillovers, it heightens the risk of labor poaching, acting as a tax on long-term research. We develop a model where this hold-up risk compels firms to substitute away from fundamental, high-spillover research toward defensive innovations—technologies that are commercially appropriable and legally robust, but scientifically less significant. To isolate causal effects, we construct counterfactual entry locations using a convolutional neural network (CNN) that accounts for unobservable local amenities. We find that the entry of large high-tech firms drives incumbents to modestly increase patent quantity, but reduces forward citations and scientific importance while leaving private stock market value unchanged. We confirm the labor poaching mechanism by exploiting state-level variation in trade secret enforceability and separating technological from product-market proximity. The results demonstrate that intense labor competition allows firms to secure private rents while degrading the aggregate knowledge stock.

Presentations: Urban Economics Association European (UEA European), London Business School Trans-Atlantic Doctoral Conference (LBS TADC), Sun Yat-sen University, Xiamen University

Abstract:  When mortgage credit expands, who captures the gains? In supply-constrained markets, credit subsidies capitalize into house prices, enriching incumbent owners while leaving new buyers no better off. We document a fundamentally different mechanism when supply is elastic. Exploiting the Duty to Serve program, which expanded GSE mortgage purchases in underserved rural areas, we find that credit expansion increased homeownership and transaction volumes while property-level prices remained stable. This quantity response enabled neighborhood transformation through household sorting: low-skilled residents moved in while high-skilled residents remained. A spatial equilibrium model reveals that the policy reduces the effective cost of homeownership by 3.3%. Elastic rural housing supply and low tenure switching costs jointly enable these gains to flow through to household welfare rather than capitalizing into prices. Nevertheless, the welfare effects are unevenly distributed: low-skilled owners capture the largest benefit while high-skilled renters bear a modest cost. 

Presentations: Urban Economics Association European (UEA European), FMA European, Oxford Future of Real Estate Initiative, DPhil Seminar at University of Oxford 

Abstract:  Shareholder proposals targeting dual-class firms receive far less voting support due to the superior voting rights of insiders. Anticipating extremely low passing rates, managers in dual-class firms advance more proposals to the voting stage. Proposals being voted on are a positive signal that attracts public attention and enhances reputation. Hence, shareholder sponsors target dual-class firms to exploit higher voting-stage probability when they expect substantial reputational gains, which explains the puzzle of dual-class proposal submission. Our model and empirical evidence fit this story nicely and reveal its heterogeneity by proposal and sponsor types. Further exploration shows that the reputation surge following dual-class proposal voting alters the pattern of the ensuing single-class proposals by the same sponsor but does not translate into significant stock market reactions.

Presentations: FMA European,  DPhil Seminar at University of Oxford