Research 

Said Foundation Best Paper Award 

Abstract: This paper examines the distributional effects of high-technology IPOs on local economies. Using a spatial difference-in-differences design that exploits withdrawn IPOs as counterfactuals, I document that high-technology listings exacerbate local inequality and gentrification. Incumbent high-skilled workers experience a permanent, market-wide wage increase of 1.51%, while Low-skilled workers see much smaller wage gains of 0.51%. Meanwhile, local housing costs rise significantly, leading to residential displacement for low-skilled workers and increased homelessness. I distinguish between potential mechanisms, finding that while liquidity shocks inflate housing costs across all IPO types, high-technology firms specifically generate skill-biased productivity spillovers that widen the wage gap. A spatial equilibrium model reveals that while realized liquidity boosts local demand by 4.8%, spatial inequality is primarily driven by knowledge spillovers that raise local high-skilled productivity by 20% at the source, an effect that attenuates with distance. Consequently, welfare outcomes diverge: high-skilled residents capture net utility gains, while low-skilled incumbents suffer welfare losses due to the increased cost of living. 

Presentations: American Finance Association (AFA), Dauphine PhD Workshop, European Finance Association Doctoral Tutorial (EFA-DT), Urban Economics Association North American (UEA North American), Financial Intermediation Research Society Ph.D Session (FIRS), Urban Economics Association European (UEA European), London Business School Trans-Atlantic Doctoral Conference (LBS TADC), Royal Economic Society Annual Conference (RES Annual Conference), Applied Young Economist Webinar, University of Oxford

Abstract:  This paper reveals a tradeoff in innovation outputs among high-technology clusters: while agglomeration enhances productivity through knowledge spillovers, competing for scarce talent distorts firms’ innovation strategies. Applying deep learning techniques to the entries of S&P 500 high-technology firms, we demonstrate that new entrants significantly alter incumbent innovation portfolios. Following firm entry, incumbents increase patent production by 7.5% and economic value by 3–4%, but they simultaneously experience a 55% reduction in citations and diminished scientific importance. This shift represents a fundamental reallocation from long-term scientific innovation to commercially focused, incremental improvements with higher immediate deployability but reduced scientific contribution. Dynamic citation analysis confirms treated patents receive more immediate citations but exhibit substantially lower long-term impact, reflecting changed R&D investment horizons. We identify labor market competition as the causal mechanism through tests exploiting variation in the labor market tightness and adoption of non-compete agreements. Our theoretical model with heterogeneous patent types demonstrates that the race for talents creates a wedge between profit-maximizing innovation strategies and social welfare optimization. New entrants choose excessive local hiring rates that maximize firm value but sub-optimize knowledge production.

Presentations: London Business School Trans-Atlantic Doctoral Conference (LBS TADC), Xiamen University

Abstract:  We examine the neighborhood-level consequences of the Duty to Serve (DTS) program, a federal mandate requiring Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) to increase mortgage purchases in underserved rural areas. The program successfully shifted GSE purchasing toward a greater share of small-balance mortgages. This expansion of credit for affordable housing, however, triggered significant neighborhood sorting. While promoting homeownership, the policy induced an out-migration of high-skilled residents and an in-migration of low-skilled residents. This demographic shift led to a counterintuitive decrease in average housing prices and rents, masking price appreciation at the lower end of the market. Our findings suggest that while DTS achieved its primary goal of expanding credit, it also inadvertently fostered economic segregation in targeted communities.

Presentations: Oxford Future of Real Estate Initiative, DPhil Seminar at University of Oxford 

Abstract:  Shareholder proposals targeting dual-class firms receive far less voting support due to the superior voting rights of insiders. Anticipating extremely low passing rates, managers in dual-class firms advance more proposals to the voting stage. Proposals being voted on are a positive signal that attracts public attention and enhances reputation. Hence, shareholder sponsors target dual-class firms to exploit higher voting-stage probability when they expect substantial reputational gains, which explains the puzzle of dual-class proposal submission. Our model and empirical evidence fit this story nicely and reveal its heterogeneity by proposal and sponsor types. Further exploration shows that the reputation surge following dual-class proposal voting alters the pattern of the ensuing single-class proposals by the same sponsor but does not translate into significant stock market reactions.

Presentations: DPhil Seminar at University of Oxford