Whether mortgage credit expansion always raises prices, leverage, and default, or whether that depends on housing supply and policy design.
A FHFA policy increases mortgage approvals by 1.35pp and homeownership over 4%, while rates, prices, and default stay flat and leverage falls
The policy delivers access, not capitalization. It is worth 6.8% of user cost reduction, two orders of magnitude above the basis-point funding wedge that produces it.
Delivered through rates the support is inert or leaks to incumbents; supply elasticity governs both how much credit policy achieves and who gains.
Presentations: American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association (AREUEA), European Summer Meeting of Econometric Society (ESEM), Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), Freddie Mac Rural Housing Symposium, Lugano Real Estate and Urban Economics Conference, Urban Economics Association Summer School, Urban Economics Association European (UEA European), Zurich-Oxford Doctoral Symposium on Real Estate Markets, FMA European, Oxford Future of Real Estate Initiative, DPhil Seminar at University of Oxford
Practitioner-oriented translation: Oxford Future of Real Estate Initiative (FoRE)
Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Said Foundation Best Paper Award
I study how high-tech IPOs affect local inequality, and find that IPOs raise high-skilled wages more than low-skilled wages, while housing costs rise enough to reduce low-skilled real wages.
Comparing tech and non-tech IPOs suggests that housing appreciation is a broad wealth effect, but only tech IPOs widen the local skill premium.
A spatial equilibrium model shows sizable local productivity gains, but also meaningful distributional costs.
Presentations: American Finance Association (AFA), Dauphine PhD Workshop, 4th Workshop on Markets and Intermediaries at Deutsche Bundesbank, Doctoral Tutorial of European Finance Association (EFA-DT), Urban Economics Association North American (UEA North American), Financial Intermediation Research Society (FIRS PhD Session), Urban Economics Association European (UEA European), London Business School Trans-Atlantic Doctoral Conference (LBS TADC), Royal Economic Society Annual Conference (RES Annual Conference), Applied Young Economist Webinar, University of Oxford
Semifinalist for the Best Paper Award at FMA International (2026)
We study a hidden cost of talent clustering: stronger local competition for inventors can distort how incumbent firms innovate.
We develop a model in which large tech-firm entry raises poaching risk and shifts incumbents away from generic research toward more defensive, commercially oriented innovation.
Using S&P 500 high-tech establishment openings, we find that nearby incumbents produce patents with lower scientific impact but similar commercial value.
The evidence suggests that technology clusters can boost productivity while also redirecting innovation away from long-horizon research.
Presentations: European Economic Association (EEA), Financial Management Association (FMA), Urban Economics Association European (UEA European), London Business School Trans-Atlantic Doctoral Conference (LBS TADC), Sheffield Bessemer Symposium in the Economics of Innovation, Sun Yat-sen University, Xiamen University
Why shareholder sponsors keep targeting dual-class firms even though proposals there are much less likely to pass?
We argue that low expected passage makes managers more willing to let proposals reach a vote, turning the voting stage itself into a source of public attention and reputational gain for sponsors.
The model and evidence show that sponsors strategically target dual-class firms when expected reputational benefits are high, with important differences across proposal and sponsor types.
The reputational boost shapes sponsors’ future proposal behavior, but does not generate meaningful stock-market reactions.
Presentations: FMA European, DPhil Seminar at University of Oxford